Eddie Hoogland v. Thomas B. Child et al : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
Eddie Hoogland v. Thomas B. Child et al : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hanson, Baldwin & Allen; Rex J. Hanson; Attorneys for Defendant;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hoogland v. Child, No. 9295 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3740
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF fTM_ E D 
EDDIE HOOGLAND, 
By his ·Guardian ad Litem,-------------------· 
Roelof Hoogland, Cier::, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THOMAS B. CHILD and C. W. 
CHILD, dba THOMAS B. 
CHILD & CO., JACK ALDER 
and ROBERT R. CHILD, dba 
ALDER-CHILD CONSTRUC-
TION CO., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
C·ase No. 9295 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT THOMAS B. CHILD 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
REX J. HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Thomas B. Child 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT 0 F POINTS -------------------------------------------- 5 
ARGUMENT ________ -------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID N·OT ERR IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ---------------------------------------- 5 
POINT II. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THERE WAS 
NO DUTY ·ON THE DEFENDANT THOMAS B. 
CHILD TO ANTICIPATE OR FORESEE THE 
OCCURRENCE OF THE ACCIDENT OR THE 
PROBABILITY OF ITS OCCURENCE. ________________ 13 
(a) PLAINTIFF WAS A TRES'PASSER. ________ 13 
(b) THE DOCTRINE OF "ATTRACTIVE NUI-
ISANCE" IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS 
SITU A TI 0 N. ---------------------------------------------------- 14 
CON CL USI 0 N ______________ ------------------------------------------------------ 36 
CASES CITED 
Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc., 339 U. S. 827, 831; 70 Sup. Ct. 
894; 94 L. Ed. 1312 ( 19'50) ------------------------------------ 10 
Barney v. H. & St. Joe Railway Co., 126 Mo. 372; 28 
S. W. 1069; 26 L. R. A. 847 -------------------------------------------- 28 
Bogden v. Los Angeles & Salt ·Lake Railway Company, 
59 Utah 505; 205 P. 571 ----------1'~------------------------------- 27 
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222; 93 P. 570 ________ 16 
Burley v. M·cDowell, 133 Colo. 581; 298 P2 399 ____________ 26 
Charvoz v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 455; 137 P. 901 ____ 18, 28 
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251; 351 P2d 624, 636, 
( 1960) ------------------------------------------------------------------------5, 12 
Flaherty v. Metro Stations, 196 N. Y. S.2d, reaffirmed 
without Op., 235 N. Y. 605; 139 N. E. 7'53 ------------ 26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued 
Page 
Jameson v. Jameson, 176 F2d 58, 60 (1949) ________________ 10 
Kelly v. Benas, 217 No. 1 116 S. W. ·557; 20 L. R. A. 
( N. S.) 903 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 28 
Kravetz v. B. Perini & Sons, 252 F2d 905 ____________________ 32 
McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 407; 100 N. E. 170 ________ 19 
Payne v. ·Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598; 221 
p. 568 --------------------------------------------------------------------20, 24, 35 
Peterson v. Farmers, 69 Utah 395; 255 P. 536 ____________ 23 
Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17; 337 P2d 59, 61, 
( 195 9) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
Rush v. ·Plains Township, 371 P. 117; 89 Atl. 2d 200 __ 29, 30 
St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co., v. Waggoner, 112 Ark. 593; 
166 s. w. 948 ------------------------------------------------------------24, 25 
Seward, et al, v. Nissen, et al, 2 F. R. D. ·545, 546; 
D. C. Del. 1942 ------------------------------------------------------------ 11 
Simmel v. New 'Jersey Co-op. Company, 28 N. J. 1; 
143 Atl. 2d 521 -------------------------------------------------------- 33 
Smalley v. Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 34 Utah 
423 ; 98 p. 311 ------------------------------------------------------------16, 28 
Tempest v. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174; 299 P2d 124____ 6 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
6 Moore Federal Practice 232·5 to 2330, Sec. 56.22 ________ 10 
Prosser, Second Edition, pp. 445 ------------------------------------ 29 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 339 ________________ 30, 32 
STATUTES CITED 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 (e) ______________ 9, 13 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 ________________________ 5, 6", 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDDIE HOOGLAND, 
By his ·Guardian ad Litem, 
Roelof Hoogland, 
Plaintiff ,and Appellant, 
vs. 
THOMAS B. CHILD and C. W. Case No. 9295 
CHILD, dba THOMAS B. 
CHILD & CO., JACK ALDER 
and ROBERT R. CHILD, dba 
ALDER-CHILD CONSTRUC-
TION CO., . 
Defendants .and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT THOMAS B. CHILD 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a Sum-
mary Judgment, in favor of all the defendants and 
against the plaintiff, No Cause of Action. The record 
of appeal consists of the pleadings and material 
contained in the appeal cover, the depositions of 
the plaintiff, Eddie Hoogland, his pa.rents, Roelof 
Hoogland and Louisa Hoogland, and the defendants, 
Thomas B. Child, and Robert R. Child. 
In the interest of consistency, in our State-
ment of Facts, when referring to the Record, we 
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will use the letter "R." Referring to the Hooglands' 
depositions, by the letter "H," and the Child deposi-
tions by the letter "C." 
Pretrial depositions were taken, from which the 
following facts appear. 
The accident happened on February 18, 1957. 
Eddie was 14 years old. (H. 3) He and his parents 
'had lived in this country a little over four years. 
He was born in Holland. He attended the 7th grade 
at the Webster School. (H. 5) On the day of the 
accident, he h,ad sloughed school at least part of 
the day and gone onto the premises of the 0. P. 
Skaggs Store, which adjoins the Thomas B. Child 
property on the north. (H. 5, 20) That was some-
time in the afternoon. 
In order to enter the Child premises, he had to 
squeeze through a small place between a fence and 
;a building. (H. 11, 20, 21) He wanted to go on the 
premises and "try that torch, so I had fifteen cents 
with me, and I bought some matches." (H. 15) 
The reason he went over to the Child premises was, 
he guessed he liked the place, the rocks and that. 
(H. 10) He went through a hole into the premises. 
When he saw a man come out, he just hid behind 
something. (H. 20) 
Mter he got through the opening and entered 
the Child premises, he saw the can and the wood 
or lumber. (H. 11) He built a fire about a foot 
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from a stack of lumber, near which the barrel was 
standing. The flames shot up about 2 feet high. He 
claimed to have extinguished the fire. (H. 27, 28, 29) 
Then he made a torch out of a stick about as long 
as his arm, around which he wrapped a piece of 
cloth, with black stuff on it, which cloth he found 
on the premises. (H. 15) At first it didn't burn 
very well. It started and burned for about 5 minutes. 
He then placed it on the ground and put the flame 
out in the sand, but it was still smoking. (H. 25) 
His attention was directed to the barrel. He lit a 
match and held it about 5 inches where he could see 
into the opening a little bit. He saw "some shiny 
black, then I knew it was some kind of dangerous 
stuff. Then I wanted to put that match from it, 
and it exploded." (H. 5, 30) . 
Robert R. Child, in his deposition, testified 
that Alder-Child Company did not have a yard in 
which to store their material at the time and that 
they had stored some materials on Thomas Child's 
premises, his father, including one or two cans of 
Sealtex, a concrete curing compound. (C. 4) This 
product had been used on nearly all of their build-
ing jobs. It was not necessary to ventilate in using 
indoors. (C. 5) It had an asphalt smell. It did not 
give off fumes. (C. 6) He had never observed any 
holes in the fence surrounding his father's premises. 
(C. 17) He had never seen children playing in the 
yard. (C. 19) 
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Thom~as B. Child testified that he is a mason 
contractor; has not done any general contracting; 
has never been in business with his son, Robert R. 
Child. His premises are enclosed by a fence. There 
are no openings except gates. (C. 20) In the past 
when children have come on his premises, he has 
ordered them out. He has some sculptured concrete 
statues, but they are not things that children play 
on. (C. 22) These statues represent different char-
acters in the Bible. It is his way of expressing his 
religion and his trade in stone. (C. 23) He permits 
children to come in the part of the premises where 
the statues are when they are accompanied by older 
people. (C. '26) He permitted his son to store equip-
ment in the yard; did not direct his son or his em-
ployees where to put the material. He didn't see 
them bring it in. He didn't store any of the material 
that was in the Sealtex can. (C. 27) He had never 
used material similar to the stuff in the can that 
exploded. (C. 28) The drums of Sealtex were back 
of the scaffolding. He didn't put them there. He 
didn't know anything about the stuff. He hadn't 
seen it. It was a common thing to have barrels 
around. (C. 2'9) He has never used Sealtex nor seen 
it used. (C. '32) He didn't know that the Sealtex 
was on his place. (C. 37) 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT-
ING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY J'UDG-
MENT. 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THERE WAS NO DUTY 
ON THE DEFENDANT THOMAS B. CH'ILD TO ANTI-
CIPATE OR FORESEE THE OCCURRENCE OF THE 
ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF ITS OCCUR-
RENCE. 
(a) PLAINTIFF WAS A TRESPASSER. 
(b) THE DOCTRINE OF "ATTRACTIVE NUI-
SANCE" IS NOT APIPLICABLE TO THIS 
SITUATION. 
ARGU·MENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT-
ING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ~UDG­
MENT. 
Under the provisions of Rule 56, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, either party may move for Sum-
mary Judgment in his favor. The purpose of this 
rule was stated in the recent case of Dupler v. Yates, 
10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P. '2d 624, 636, (1960) as 
follows: 
''The primary purpose of the Summary 
Judgment procedure is to pierce the allega-
tions of the pleadings, show that there is no 
genuine issue or of material fact, although 
an issue may be raised by the pleadings, and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." 
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The rule further permits a Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment to be rested upon supporting affi-
davits and supplemented by depositions. See Tempest 
v. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174, 299 P. 2d 124. How-
ever, affidavits relied upon in a Summary Judg-
ment proceeding must meet specific requirements 
as outlined in Rule 56 (e) : 
"Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show ~affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters state,d therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred 
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto 
or served therrwith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions or by further affidavits." (Em-
phasis added) 
The only counteraffidavit filed in opposition 
to the depositions and affidavit relied upon in sup-
port of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was that of Gordon I. Hyde, the plaintiff's attorney. 
A somewhat detailed examination of that document 
follows for the purpose of demonstrating that it 
does not comply with the requirements of Rule 
5'6 (e). 
In paragraph 1 of the counteraffidavit, Mr. 
Hyde states under oath that he "is best informed 
... of the relevant facts" concerning the accident. 
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This can only be taken to mean that after his investi-
gation, more competent and specific testimony is 
unavailable. 
Paragraph 2 contains a statement to the effect 
that he examined the property where the accident 
took place, and that it was not "all fenced" as 
alleged in the affidavit of Robert R. Child. Mr. 
Hyde does not presume to know whether or not the 
property was fenced at the time the accident oc-
curred, and certainly his personal observation at 
some later date is not competent. In the same para-
graph, a statement is made to the effect that "chil-
dren in the neighborhood customarily entered the 
property" and that this fact "was known and should 
have reasonably been known to all of the defeQ-
dants." These statements are conclusionary in n·a-
ture and do not rest upon any factual information 
by individuals having specific knowledge concern-
ing the same. They are at best allegations which 
tend to expand the pleadings previously filed. 
In paragraph 3 of the Counteraffidavit, Mr. 
Hyde presumes to state his opinion concerning the 
chemical qualities of the Sealtex compound which 
was stored by the defendants on their premises with-
out "affirmatively" showing that he was competent 
to testify concerning the matters stated, as required 
by Rule 56 (e). Certainly his testimony would not 
be admissible in evidence at trial, because Mr. Hyde 
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has not shown himself affirmatively qualified to 
testify concerning such technical matters. 
Mr. Hyde, in paragraph 4 of the Counteraffi-
davit, alleges that the defendants were "negligent" 
because the cap on the barrel was not in place. Such 
is a legal conclusion and certainly has no place in 
an evidentiary affidavit under the provisions of 
Rule 5'6(e). 
Paragraph 5 contains assertions by Mr. Hyde 
as to what was "known" by defendants, based upon 
his investigation. However, other than the evidence 
contained in the defendants' depositions and the 
affidavit of Mr. Child, there is no other competent 
testimony upon which the trial court or this court 
may rely. What was known by the defendants as 
testified to in their depositions is uncontroverted 
by any competent evidence. 
Further statements are contained in the docu-
ment, to the effect that "it was perfectly obvious 
to any person entering upon the property and exam-
ining it, that the cost of closing the fence would 
have been nominal to the defend·ants." Such is mere-
ly a conclusionary statement concerning which Mr. 
Hyde has again not affirmatively shown himself 
competent to testify. 
The substance of paragraph 6 of the Counter-
affidavit contains further incompetent assertions 
and legal conclusions. An allegation is made to the 
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effect that "things" on the property were "attrac-
tive nuisances to children in the neighborhood." 
Such is a legal conclusion without foundation in 
fact. 
Even a cursory review of the Counteraffidavit 
will reveal that it is in the nature of an expanded 
pleading in which assertions and allegations, not 
founded on competent testimony, are made and upon 
which a court cannot properly rest a denial of de-
fendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Frequent interpretation has been given to Rule 
56 (e), Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical 
to the Utah Rule. In discussing this rule, James 
William 'Moore observes: 
"The affidavit, supporting or opposing, 
with which we are now concerned is the evi-
dentiary affidavit whose form and content 
is governed by Rule 56 (e). This affidavit 
must be on the personal knowledge of the affi-
ant, set forth facts that would be admissible 
in evidence and show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. In reference to the latter mat-
ter, if the facts stated show that the affiant 
possesses the requisite competency ... 
* * * 
"Mfidavits containing statements made 
merely 'on information and belief' will be 
disregard. Hearsay testimony and opinion 
testimony that would not be admissible if 
testified to at the trial may not properly be· 
set forth in an affidavit. The affidavit is no 
place for ultimate facts and conclusions of 
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law, nor for arguments of the party's cause 
... An attorney's affidavit not made on his 
personal knowledge of the facts, but merely 
stating what he believes or what he intends 
to prove at the trial does not measure up to 
the requirements of Rule 56(e)." 6 Moore 
Federal Practice, p. 2325 to 2330, Sec. 56.22 
The cases which have considered the effect and 
content of affidavits filed under the provisions of 
this Rule support the pronouncements of Mr. Moore. 
In the case of Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co., 
Inc., v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U. S. 827, 831; 
70 Sup. Ct. 894; 94 L. Ed. 1312 (1950) rehearing 
denied, the Supreme Court disregarded an affidavit 
of the petitioner's attorney in support of the Motion 
for Summary Judgment in the following language: 
''In any event, there is nothing available 
in the record to support the averment, since 
the affidavit in support thereof was made 
upon information and belief and the relevant 
portion, at least, does not comply with Rule 
56 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.'' 
The United States Court of Appeal for the 
District of Columbia, in the case of Jameson v. Jame-
son, 176 F. 2d 58, 60, (1949), speaking through 
Justice Clark, stated the followin·g concerning Rule 
56(e): 
"This rule plainly requires (the word 
'shall' being mandatory) that an affidavit 
shall state matters personally known to the 
affiant. A statement in such affidavit as to 
10 
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what the affiant 'verily believes' does not sat-
isfy this require1nent. Belief, no matter how 
sincere, is not equivalent to knowledge. It is 
further required that the facts set forth in 
the affidavit be such as would be admissible 
in evidence should they be given from the wit-
ness stand during trial of the case. The state-
ments in the appellant's affidavit which we 
have outlined above would, if given as testi-
mony, be clearly objectionable as being hear-
say. As one Federal court put it: 
'Mfidavits filed by party in support 
of or in opposition to a motion for sum-
mary judgment must present evidence. 
The affidavits should follow substan-
tially the same form as though the affi-
ant were giving testimony in court.' " 
Quoting D. C. Del. 1942, Seward, et ~al, v. 
Nissen, et al, 2 F. R. D. 545, 546. 
In reviewing the decision of the trial court, 
which granted defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment in the case of Richards v. Anderson, 9 
Utah 2d 17; 337 P. 2d 59, 61, (19'5'9), our Supreme 
Court, in sustaining the Trial Court, stated : 
''In the ·absence of any other record, it 
stands unassailed as reflecting the facts pre-
sented to the court. If the plaintiff contends 
to the contrary, he has the burden of bring-
ing the record here to show otherwise, because 
the burden is upon the appellant to show 
error." 
Thus, the ·appellant is required, on this appeal, 
to rely upon competent testimony presented to the 
trial court if he is to succeed in this proceeding. The 
11 
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burden is upon him to show error and to produce 
a record containing competent testimony which will 
support his ,allegations. This the defendant has failed 
to do. 
The effect of failing to properly controvert 
matters presented at summary judgment is dis-
cussed in the recent case of Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 
2d 251, 351, P. 2d 624, ( 1960). There a motion for 
summary judgment was granted upon inference, 
arising in the pleadings that the plaintiffs had been 
fully compensated for damages which they sought 
against one of the defendants. The plaintiffs made 
no affirmative showing with respect to this issue, 
although counteraffidavits were filed concerning 
another ,case. The Supreme Court, in reviewing the 
state of the pleadings, observed: 
"We then h·ave an unverified amended 
complaint aligned against admissible evidence 
in support of motion for summary judgment 
and which is uncontroverted, would entitle the 
defendant to judgment as ·a matter of law." 
* * * 
''It is apparent here that the defendants 
had produced evidence that pierces the alle-
gations of the complaint. The plaintiffs have 
not controverted, explained or destroyed the 
evidence by counteraffidavit or otherwise. 
They have relied upon their amended com-
plaint and their proposed amendment to the 
amended ·Complaint. 
''Certainly if summary judgment pro-
cedure is to be effective, it must be held that 
when adequ·ate proof is submitted in support 
12 
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of the motion, the pleadings are not sufficient 
to raise an issue of fact." 
It is respectfully subn1itted that, in the instant 
case, the counteraffidavit of Mr. Hyde should be 
disregarded, inasmuch as it does not comply with 
the requirements of Rule 56 (e), as to the form of 
the affidavit and presents no competent evidence 
upon which this court should rely. Under the de-
cided cases, such testimony is not admissible at trial 
and cannot properly be considered here. Thus, the 
testimony which was presented by defendants in 
support of their Motion for Summary Judgment in 
the trial court was, and remains uncontroverted. 
The trial court did not err in granting defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER 'OF LAW, THERE WAS NO DUTY 
ON THE DEFENDANT THOMAS B. CHILD TO ANTI-
CIPATE OR FORESEE THE OCC·URRENCE OF THE 
ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF ITS OCCUR-
RENCE. 
(a) PLAINTIFF WAS A TRESPASSER. 
(b) THE DOCTRINE OF "ATTRACTIVE NUI-
SANCE" IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS 
SITUATION. 
('a) The accident occurred in the afternoon, 
while school was in session. Eddie h·ad sloughed and 
had entered the insured's premises without permis-
sion. Thomas Child testified that children were not 
permitted on any part of the premises, except when 
13 
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they were accomp·anied by their p·arents; in such in-
stances they were permitted on the part of the prem-
ises where the concrete monuments were, to the 
south of where the accident happened. The area 
was enclosed by a fence varying in height from 4 
to 6 feet. Access to the premises was by two gates, 
which were generally not locked. (C. 20, 21) If he 
ever noticed any openings or damage to the fencing, 
he repaired it. (C. ·33) On the north end the 
fence did extend to some sheds. On occasion, children 
had made an opening between the shed and the 
fence, which he had repaired whenever observed. 
(C. 34) There had never been a prior accident in 
his yard. Child said that whenever children were 
observed on the premises, they were ordered off, 
·and that on some occasions he had called the police. 
Eddie Hoogland entered the premises through 
a small place that he had to go through sideways. 
(C. 11, 19) After entering, he testified he saw a 
man "come out and he just hid behind something." 
( H.20) So he knew that he was tresp·assing at the 
time. There is no evidence that the area was used 
as a playground by children or that they habitually 
traversed the area. The evidence is undisputed that 
Eddie's status was th·at of a trespasser. 
(b) The Doctrine of "Attractive Nuisance" 
Is Not Applicable to This Sit'Uation. 
The doctrine of attractive nuisance is not ap-
14 
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plicable to this situation. As has been stated, the 
premises to the rear of Thomas Child's home are 
divided into two parts. On the south half he has lo-
cated the concrete statues or monuments depicting 
Biblical scenes and characters. As he said in his 
deposition, this is 'a hobby by which he expresses 
his religion through knowledge obtained in his trade. 
On the north half of the area he had stored his mix-
ing equipment and certain other building materials. 
In addition, he permitted Alder-Child Construction 
Company to store building materials there. Robert 
Child, a partner of the company, is his son; but there 
is no business connection or other relationship be-
tween them. Material stored by Alder-Child con-
sisted mostly of stacked lumber and two 53-gallon 
drums of Sealtex, a concrete curing compound, which 
were located near the north end of the lumber. There 
were also two cement mixers located southeast of 
the two drums and one to the east of them. There 
was nothing unusual about these materials and these 
cement mixers, which were commonplace equipment. 
The drums were black metal containers, with no 
marking of any kind on the outside. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, if the 
owner leaves or maintains something upon his 
premises under circumstances which naturally tend 
to attract or allure young children of imm·ature 
judgment and to induce them to believe that they 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
are 'at liberty to enter and handle or play with it, 
there is in effect an invitation to them to come upon 
the premises. Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 
93 Pac. 570; Smalley v. Rio Grande Western Rail-
. ~ 
road Comp,any, 34 Utah 423, 98 Pac. 311, and the 
instrument must not only be dangerous and attrac-
tive, but the circumstances of leaving and maintain-
it must also be such ·as to induce young children to 
believe that they are at liberty to enter and h'andle 
or play abotlt it. Smalley v. Rio Grande Western 
R~ailroad Company, supra. 
In Brown v. Salt Lake City, supra, the child 
was drowned in a water conduit located near an 
elementary grade school. The evidence showed th'at 
for a considerable period of time before the accident, 
children had played in and about the conduit, and 
that delegations of citizens had complained to the 
city of the danger. The Supreme Court held that 
the question of whether the City was negligent in 
leaving unguarded the entrance to the conduit was 
for the jury and affirmed a plaintiff's verdict. 
In the case of S??Wlley v. Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company, supra, the Court refused to ap-
ply the doctrine when a plaintiff of 5 ye~ars of age, 
who, with his brother, 8 years of age, while playing 
in the def~ndant's railroad yards, was struck by a 
car which had been "kicked" by a switch engine, 
and which the boy attempted to board while in mo-
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tion. The Court there observed at page 319 that: 
"It is not the keeping or leaving of all 
kinds of dangerous and attractive machines 
or other instruments upon premises that ren-
ders the owner or occupant liable if he does 
not take precautions to guard or protect them, 
or to prevent intrusions and un·authorized 
visits of children. The instrument or agency 
must not only be dangerous and attractive, 
but the circumstances of leaving and main-
taining it must also be such as to induce young 
children to believe that they are .at liberty to 
enter .and handle or play about it. That is, it 
must be made to appear, either from the char-
acter of the instrument or agency itself, or 
from the manner and circumstances under 
which it was m·aintained or left about the 
premises, or from other conduct on the part 
of the owner or occupant of the premises, that 
an inducement or its equivalent was held out 
to young children to enter.'' (Italics supplied) 
The plaintiff urged that there was ·a duty of 
lookout imposed upon the defendant because its em-
ployees knew that children played in the area. The 
Court in commenting upon this allegation, com-
mented as follows: 
"Before it can be urged that the em-
ployees were required to observe a lookout 
and to operate and m·anage the cars about 
the yard with reference to the plaintiff's pres-
ence, it must first be made to appear that 
they owed a duty in the premises to use care 
. . . For every case of actionable negligence 
involves a duty to use care, and a breach of 
such duty resulting in injttry." ·(Italics sup-
plied) 
17 
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Under the circumstances presented in the case, 
the Court found that there was no duty owing on 
the part of the defendant's employees to exercise 
care in the handling of cars about the yard until 
the plaintiff was discovered. The Court further 
stated at p'age 320: 
"It was not the manner in which the car 
was operated that caused it to collide with 
the plaintiff, or that caused the plaintiff com-
ing in con tact with it. The direct cause of his 
coming in contact with the car was his taking 
hold of the car and attempting to ride on it 
without the knowledge or consent of defend-
ant's employees. While a child, because of 
its age, cannot be regar.ded as a conscious 
trespasser, nor held chargeable of contributory 
negligence, nevertheless, the consequences of 
its acts cannot be charged to the defendtlnt. 
The conduct of the child was in no sense in-
fluenced or induced by any act or conduct 
on the part of the defendant or its employees, 
nor was the injury occasioned because of any 
negligence on their part. We are of the opinion 
th'at the court was justified in directing a 
verdict in favor of the defendant." (Italics 
supplied) 
The attractiveness must be shown to have been 
the proximate cause of the injury Charvoz v. Salt 
Lake City, 42 Utah 455, 131 Pac. 901. In this case 
the Court held that a small stre'am of mineral water 
flowing into a ditch, through a culvert, was not, 
because it was warm, an attractive nuisance under 
the doctrine of the "turntable cases" so as to render 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the City liable for the death of a child 17 months 
old, who was found dead in the ditch by the child's 
mother. 
In reviewing the evidence, the Court pointed 
to the fact that there was no evidence to show that 
the dece~ased child, or any child for that matter, was 
attracted by the water- flowing in the ditch in ques-
tion. In the absence of testimony to this effect, the 
Court observed that: 
"The presumption, or inference, is there-
fore th·at the deceased child, as well as other 
children in the neighborhood, followed their 
natural childish propensities of playing in the 
stream of water is absolutely dissipated or 
overcome. There is therefore neither direct nor 
inferential evidence in support of the implied 
finding that the deceased child was attracted 
by the warm water flowing in the .ditch." 
(Italics supplied) 
The Court also observed that there was no show-
ing that the attractiveness of the water was the 
proximate cause of the child's death. The Court, in 
discussing this principle, stated: 
"That the attractiveness must be shown 
to have been the proximate cause is clearly 
illustrated by the Supreme Court of Illinois 
in the very recent case entitled McDermott v. 
Burke, 256 Ill. 407, 100 N. E. 170, where the 
Court s·aid : 
'Another essential condition to lia-
bility is that the attractive thing, or some-
thing inseparably connected with it, must 
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be the proximate cause of the injury.' " 
(Italics supplied) 
In the case of Payne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar (/om-
pany, 62 Utah 598, 221 Pac. 568, defendant had 
constru·cted a sugar beet dump on the railroad right 
of way. This was a device for unloading sugar beets 
from the farmers' wagons into the cars on the rail-
road track. Above the platform upon which the 
wagons were driven for unloading, a scaffold was 
erected over 'and across which cables were extended, 
which, upon the side immediately adjoining the lo-
cation of the spur track, were fastened to and in-
tended to raise and lower a screen or chute over 
which the beets were passed before falling into the 
railroad car. The cables passed over the pulleys at 
the top of and on each side of the scaffold. The beet 
dump was located in a sparsely settled area, but 
frequently children accomp'anied their fathers in 
hauling beets; and while the unloading was in prog-
ress, played around the structure and climbed up 
and down the ladder to the side of it, and slid down 
the c'ables above referred to, all of which was ob-
served by the employees of the sugar company. One 
afternoon the plaintiff, 'aged 14, climbed down a 
ladder while his companion slid down one of the 
cables to the ground. The boys began swinging the 
cables back and forth, when one of the cables got 
out of the pulley at the top, and in attempting to 
replace it, it came in contact with ~a high-tension 
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wire belonging to another company; and the plain-
tiff was injured. Plaintiff had judgment in the court 
below. It was contended that the doctrine of "attrac-
tive nuisance" applied. On ·appeal, the case was 
reversed 'and remanded for new trial. 
In denying application of the doctrine, the 
Court asserted that under the evidence: 
"We believe that the structure involved 
here was not shown to be either novel in char-
acter or attractive or dangerous to children, 
within the meaning of the Utah cases. It was 
no more novel in character th·an a cattle-loa.d-
ing chute or a water tank upon a railroad 
right of way; ·and it is not shown to have been 
any more attractive or dan·gerous than such 
structures might be. Even though we assume 
that it was ·attractive as a coasting place, or 
a place over which to race horses, that it had 
been so used by children, ·and that the de-
fendant was charged with notice that it was 
attractive to boys ·and girls for such purposes, 
still there is not the slightest suggestion in 
the evidence that the structure was at all 
dangerous when so used. The injury sustained 
by the pla·intijf was from a use which no 
reasonable man could or would have antici-
pated and from a use to which no child is 
shown to have theretofore put it. 
" ... As to him (plaintiff), the loose 
hanging cables did not constitute an attrac-
tion, for with apparent deliberation he chose 
not to use the cables for the purpose of slid-
ing down them, as his associate did a few mo-
ments before the accident. Not until his com-
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panion had discovered that the cable had come 
off the pulley and not until his companion had 
failed in his efforts to replace it, did the plain-
tiff concern himself with the cable at all, and 
then, when he did concern himself with it, he 
did with the cable that which the defendant 
certainly could never have anticip·ated that 
he or any other boy or girl would do with it. 
He swun·g it outward in an attempt to flip 
it back upon its pulley, and swung it so far 
that it came in contact with the electric wire 
of the power line, over which the defendant 
had no supervision or control, and which was 
outside of the right of way upon which the 
defendant's structure was built. It certainly 
cannot be said that his conduct was that of 
a child of immature years attracted to a dan-
gerous instrumentality maintained by the de-
fendant so as to bring him within the doctrine 
of the decision of this court hereinbefore re-
ferred to. Nor can it be said that the circum-
stances of the accident were such that the 
defendant might reasonably h·ave anticipated 
them, and so have been required to guard 
against them. 
'' ... The plaintiff was not attracted to 
the structure by reason of the loose h·anging 
cables, and when he re·ached the structure, 
he was not attracted to them by any appeal 
that they made to his childish instincts. There 
is no evidence that any other child at any time 
was attracted by and amused itself with the 
cables, except that it does appear that plain-
tiff's companion safely slid down one of the 
cables immediately before the accident, and 
there is not the slightest suggestion in the evi-
dence that sliding down the cables was at all 
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dangerous. At any rate, the plaintiff was not 
attracted by the cable as a thing to slide down 
upon, nor was he injured in so doing. He was 
not injured until he m·ade use of the cable in 
a most unusual and extraordinary way, and 
used it in such ·a way that it cannot possibly 
be said that the defendant might have reason-
ably anticipated such use." (Italics supplied) 
See also Peterson v. ~armers, 69 Utah 395, 2'55 
Pac. 436, in which the Court reversed a verdict in 
favor of a plaintiff aged 7 ye·ars who was injured 
when he got upon a manlift in an elevator building, 
caused the lift to rise, 'and a rope broke, permitting 
the elevator to fall to the floor. The Court stated 
at page 398 of the Utah report: 
"In support of the judgment, the plain-
tiff relies upon the doctrine of attractive nui-
sance or the turntable cases. This doctrine 
is to the general effect that under certain 
circumstances it is action·able negligence to 
leave on one's premises an ungu·arded, dan-
gerous thing to which children ·are likely to 
be attracted for sport or play. This rule of 
liability is subject to numerous limitations 
and needs very careful statement not to make 
it an unjust and impractical requirement; 
and the principle, if accepted, must be cauti-
ously applied. In one of these cases only was 
liability upheld. In the other four it was de-
nied." (Italics supplied). (All ~ases referred 
to are Utah cases and have heretofore been 
discussed. ) 
The foregoing decisions hold that before the 
doctrine of attractive nuisance can apply: 
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1. The instrumentality which injures the child 
must itself be so attractive to children of immature 
years that its existence or m·aintenance on the own-
er's premises must constitute an implied invitation 
to children or persons of immature years to enter 
the premises, which the owner in the exercise of 
reasonable care should foresee. 
2. The instrumentality must be inherently 
dangerous, which must be known to the owner of the 
premises. 
3. The instrumentality must have been the 
proximate cause of the accident and resulting injury. 
Eddie testified that he did not see these cans 
until after he was on the premises. (H. 11) Ob-
viously they did not attract him. There was nothing 
unusual or attractive about the drums. They were 
composed of black metal, with no outside markings 
indic·ating the contents were flamm·able or explosive. 
They could have contained water or ·any of anum-
ber of substances. The drums are commonplace, 
frequently seen around service stations, dumps, or 
construction areas. Many are commonly used as 
trash containers. There was noting to put the de-
fendant, Thomas Child, on notice th·at Eddie might 
be attracted to the can and hold a lighted match to 
the opening. Payne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 
supra. 
In St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Waggoner, 112 
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Ark. 593, 166 S. W. 948, it was held that the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine h·ad no application in a case 
where a 10-year-old boy removed the stopper from 
an empty alcohol barrel on the platform of the rail-
road station of its destination, and placed a lighted 
match at the vent, causing an explosion of gas 
formed from the small amount of liquid left in it, 
although the barrel had a caution tag on the end 
on which it was standing, placed on the b·arrel when 
it was full and not required on empty barrels, the 
Court concluding that the railroad company could 
not reasonably anticipate that dangerous explosives 
would, under the circumstan~ces, be produced, or 
that children would be attracted to the barrel and 
m'ake a plaything of it, or that they would do what 
they actually did do. 
The Sealtex was a commercial product used 
extensively by Alder-Child Company in their con-
struction business. They had never heard of any 
fire, danger, or explosion involving the use of the 
product. 
A number of courts recognize that one who 
stores upon his premises an inherently dangerous 
substance, such as dynamite, or dynamite caps, can-
not avoid liability to trespassin'g children, who ob-
tain such substances and explode them to their in-
jury, where the owner is charged with knowledge 
of probable presence of children on his premises but 
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nevertheless stores such substances in such manner 
as to be accessible to children. The courts also have 
held th'at some substances~ such as gasoline, cannot 
be classified as inherently dangerous. In the case 
of Flaherty v. Metro Stations, 196 N. Y. 8.2 af-
firmed without Op. 235 N. Y. 605, 139 N. E. 753, 
it was held that a landlord could not be held liable 
for injuries to a 7-year-old child, who, with com-
panions of about the same age, obtained gasoline 
from an open can on defendant's premises, the can 
being used to catch drippings from the hose used 
in filling truck tanks, spilled some of the substance 
on his clothes, which later ignited when one of his 
companions threw a can of such gasoline upon fire. 
The court said: 
''The doctrine of attractive nuisance on 
private property is in my opinion no part of 
the law of this State. A principle, however, 
analo~ous to that requiring wild anim'als and 
fire to be kept at one's peril seems applicable 
to the keeping of high explosives such as dy-
namite. I do not find the rule ·as yet extended 
to electric wires; further, I would not be in-
clined to class gasoline ·at the present time 
as a dangerous explosive, (like dynamite or 
powder). Though somewhat volatile and high-
ly inflammable, it has come into such common 
use as to be classed rather as one of the every-
day necessities of modern life, concerning the 
keeping of which no higher responsibility 
should be imposed." 
In Burley v. 1Y.lcDowell, 133 Colo., 5'81, 298 P.2 
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399, the Colorado Supreme Court held that where 
a 9-year-old boy was injured while playing with de-
defendant's child on defendant's premises, when 
burned by gasoline which the boys had unauthorized-
ly procured from another building on the premises, 
and ignited it by a candle on the boy's toy boat, that 
the defendant was not guilty of negligence and 
could not be held to a duty to anticipate the child's 
actions. The ease was tried to the judge without a 
jury. The Supreme Court affirmed his decision and 
inferred that defendant was not negligent as a mat-
ter of law. 
Thomas Child was not present when the drums 
were brought to his place. (C. 27) He was unaware 
of the contents. (C. 29, 37) He had never used the 
product in his business. 
In Bogden v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railway 
Company, 59 Utah 505, 205 Pac. 571, the Utah Su-
preme Court held the existence of the dangerous 
substance must be known to the defendant. In this 
decision, a railroad company was held not liable 
for injuries to ·a boy from the explosion of powder 
which the boy found in one of its boxcars, when 
powder was left in the car by a consignee, who un-
loaded it a short time before the ·accident, and the 
railroad campany had no knowledge that it was in 
the car. 
"Again, the defendant h·ad nothing to 
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do with the dangerous thing except to trans-
port it with due circumspection and care so as 
to injure no one who was where he had a 
right to be. Moreover, in view that nothing 
of a similar nature had ever occurred before, 
the defendant had 'a right to assume that the 
consignee had performed its duty and had 
removed all the powder from the car. In that 
regard it cannot be charged with negligence 
until it knew or was put upon notice that 
some powder was left in the car. While or-
dinarily the question of whether a person 
knew, or ought to have known, of a particu-
lar fact is a question of fact for the jury, 
yet when, as here, there is no dispute con-
cerning the facts, and there is absolutely 
nothing upon which such a finding or conclu-
sion ·Could be based, the question is one of law, 
as was held in the Smalley Case. The following 
cases are directly in point, and fully support 
the doctrine laid down in Smalley v. Railroad 
and Charvoz v. Salt Lake City, supra; Barney 
v. H. & St. Joe Ry. Co., 126 Mo. 372, 28 S. W. 
1069, 26 L. R. A. 847; Kelley v. Benas, 217 
Mo. 1, 116 S. W. 557, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
903. 
"There is nothing in this case whieh 
would authorize a finding th,at the plaintiff 
was enticed, lured, or attracted by ·anything 
the defendant did or omitted to do to the 
car in question, and hence the case clearly and 
manifestly does not come within the doctrine 
of the turntable cases or that of attractive 
nuisance." 
On the question of whether the railroad com-
pany was negligent in storing dangerous explosives, 
the court said: 
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"It is only where a higly explosive sub-
stance or other dangerous instrumentality is 
knowingly placed in a public place where 
people, including children, have a right to 
be, or where such a substance or instrument-
ality or agency is knowingly placed or left 
'in the way that he (the owner) knows the 
licensee - a child of tender years - is habi-
t~~ally ~accustomed to go, and where an ordin-
arily prudent person would reasonably expect 
him to go, and be thereby injured,' that cre-
ates liability. (Italics ours) When the ele-
ments that are there stated as constituting the 
basis of liability are contr·asted with the un-
disputed facts in the case at bar, we have not 
the slightest hesitancy in saying that the 
decision in that case does not justify a re-
covery in the case at blar. The slightest re-
flection will make clear that the elements 
there stated are entirely lacking in this case." 
It is submitted that the hazard of blasting 
powder is much greater than that of Sealtex. 
Was Thom·as Child, in the exercise of reason-
able care, required to inspect the premises to ascer~ 
tain that the contents of the drum was Sealtex? Ac-
cording to Prosser, Second Edition, pp. 445: 
"All courts appear to agree, that the 
occupier is not required to use care to provide 
a safe place to trespassers by inspecting the 
premises to discover possible dangers of which 
he is not ·aware." 
Representative of these decisions is the case of 
Rush v. Plains Township, a decision of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, found at 371 Pa. 117, 89 
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Atl.2 200 This case involved an action by a minor, 
through his guardian, for a personal injury received 
when he was burned at a dump, owned and operated 
by the Township. The minor, aged 7, went to the 
dump with his brother, to get some funny books. 
The facts revealed th·at the dump was used by the 
townspeople as well as the officials of the Town-
ship itself. A fire was burning approximately 30 
feet from the place where the minor was injured. 
He walked onto the dump, across the surface, which 
appeared to be solid, but through which he fell up 
to his neck. He was severely burned by coals which 
were smoldering underneath. 
The evidence showed that fires had been burn-
ing on the dump for several years and that the 
Township authorities should have known that child-
ren would and did play there. The trial court granted 
a nonsuit, and its decision was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania. The decision is based 
upon Section 339 of the Restatement of the Law of 
Torts, which has been adopted ·as the law in Penn-
sylvania, and it reads as follows: 
"A possessor of land is subject to liabil-
ity for bodily harm to young children tres-
p·assing thereon caused by a structure or 
other artificial condition which he maintains 
upon the land if (a) the place where the 
condition is 1naintained is one upon which 
the possessor knows or should have known 
that such children are likely to trespass, and 
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(b) the condition is one which the possessor 
knows or should know and which he realizes 
or should realize as involving an unreason-
able risk of death or serious bodily harm to 
such children, and (c) the children, because 
of their youth, do not discover the condition or 
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in 
it or coming within the ·area made dangerous 
by it, and (d) the utility to the possessor of 
maintaining the condition is slight as com-
pared to the risk to young children involved 
therein." 
The opinion contains the following language: 
"We agree with the contention of plain-
tiff that the Township should, under the tes-
timony, have known that children were likely 
to trespass upon this ground, but we disagree 
with their contention that the Township 
should have realized that the place where the 
accident occurred involved ·an unreasonable 
risk of death or serious bodily harm to tres-
passing children. If plaintiff's injuries had 
occurred at the place where the fire was or 
had been burning, a different question would 
have been presented; but since the injury oc-
curred in a part of the ,dump where there 
w~as no fire ~and no evidence that prior to the 
accident there had been any fire, and since it 
was clearly and indisputably a latent condi-
tion of which the defendant ,did not have any 
actual knowledge or constructive notice, plain-
tiff connot recover." ·(Italics supplied) 
In the instant case, the facts are clear that 
the condition which brought about injury was a 
latent condition of which the defendant did not 
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have any actual knowledge or constructive notice; 
and the plaintiff, therefore, should not recover 
against the defendant, Thomas B. Child. 
Another case illustrative of the same proposi-
tion arose in the State of Pennsylvania and was 
tried in the U. S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania and appealed to the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The case is 
Kravetz v. B. Perini & Sons, 2·52 Fed. 2 905. In this 
case the minor, aged 8% years, was injured near 
his home by falling from construction on a freeway 
interchange.· The trial court granted an involuntary 
nonsuit, and its decision was affirmed by the Cir-
cuit Court. 
Since the law of Pennsylvania applied, and the 
jurisdiction has adopted the rule stated and pre-
viously quoted from the Restatement of Torts, the 
decision is also based upon the principle announced 
in the Restatement. At page 908 of that decision, 
the court uses the following language in referring 
to a comment from the Restatement about Section 
339: 
"The restatement states that the rule 
does not require him (the possessor of land) 
to keep his land free from conditions which 
even young children are likely to observe and 
the full extent of the risk involved ·and which 
they are likely to realize. The purpose of the 
duty is to protect children from dangers which 
they ·are unlikely to appreciate and not to pro-
tect them against harm resulting from their 
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own immature recklessness in the case of 
known danger." 
Another case treating particularly the lack of 
obligation on the landowner's part to inspect the 
premises periodically for the purpose of determin-
ing whether dangerous artificial conditions exist 
thereon is the case of Simmel v. New Jersey Co-op 
Company, a decision of the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey found at 28 N. J. 1, 143 Atl.2 521. In this 
case the defendant owned or had recently purchased 
a lot across the street from the home of the infant 
who was injured, which had for some time prior 
thereto been used as a junk yard and dumping place 
by people in the general neighborhood. The infant, 
aged 4, wandered across the street, stumbled on 
some junk which was on fire, and was burned. The 
testimony was that the vacant lot had been used 
as a dump for rubbish and debris some time prior 
to the accident; that its potential dangers were rec-
ognized by the residents of the neighborhood. The 
evidence further showed that there were fires on 
the premises every day, or practically every day, 
and the children were constantly playing in the lot 
or cutting across it on their way to school. 
From a judgment on a jury verdict in the plain-
tiff's favor, the appeal was prosecuted and the case 
was sent b·ack for a new trial, based upon the in-
structions relating to the question of actual knowl-
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edge. In the instant case there is no actual or con-
structive knowledge. However, in the decision, the 
court employs the following language: 
"It should be recognized, however, that 
the landowner or occupier is not an insurer of 
the infant. He has no duty to periodically in-
spect the premises in order to ascertain 
whether third persons, themselves trespas-
sers, might have created dangerous artificial 
conditions thereon. The maintenance here is 
alleged to consist of toleration or sufferance 
of or acquiescence in the acts of others; but 
before the defendant can be said to have so 
endured the other's conduct, he must have 
actual knowledge of the condition created by 
third persons unrelated to him.'' 
Even though Alder and Child Construction Com-
pany were not trespassers, in that they had stored 
the Sealtex on the premises, with Thomas Child's 
permission, the principle of this decision is applic-
able, inasmuch as Child had no actual or construc-
tive knowledge that the metal drum contained Seal-
tex. In storing the material on the premises, Alder-
Child were licensees ; there was no legal or business 
relationship between that company and the defen-
dant, Thomas Child. The Sealtex was not dangerous 
to the plaintiff until he made it so by holding a 
match near the opening. The hazard was created 
by him. There is evidence that Eddie was in a special 
class at school, may have been somewhat retarded 
as comp:ared to other members of his regular class. 
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However, he was aware that he was on Thomas 
Child's premises without permission; when he saw 
a man come out "he just hid behind something." 
(H. 20) He had seen cans like the Sealtex drum 
before, "the stuff inside they use for road oil." 
(H. 18) When he lighted the match an·d looked in 
the barrel, he saw some shiny black stuff which 
he knew was dangerous. (H. 30) Ap·parently he did 
not habitually carry matches, because he bought a 
box before going on the premises. (H. 15) 
There are some dangers common in the com-
munity which any child of sufficient ·age to be al-
lowed at large may be expected to understand and 
appreciate, such as the usual risks of fire. In Payne 
v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, supra, the Supreme 
Court expressed doubt whether the '''attractive nui-
s·ance" doctrine was applicable to that accident, 
which resulted in injury to a 12lf2-year-old boy. 
Certainly Eddie appreciated the possible haz-
ard involved, and his act in lighting the match was 
the sole proximate cause of this unfortunate acci-
dent. His statement to the police ·after the ·accident 
that some older boy had thrust a stick into the barrel 
was an attempt to divest himself of blame and shows 
an awareness of wrongdoing. '(Louisa Hoogland 
deposition ·H. 38) 
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CONCLUSION 
In addition to the authorities herein cited, de-
fendant Thomas Child relies upon any pertinent 
authorities cited in the Brief of Alder-Child rele-
vant to his position. It is respectfully submitted that 
the uncontradicted testimony as shown in the depo-
sition establishes as a matter of law: 
1. That plaintiff was a tresp·asser, to which 
the defendant, Thomas Child, owed no duty, because: 
(a) The doctrine of "attractive nuisance" 
as a matter of law does not apply to this situation; 
(b) Thomas Child was unaware of the 
contents of the metal drums; and under the circum-
stances was under no obligation to know what the. 
drums contained; 
(c) That Seal tex was not inherently dan-
gerous; did not attract the minor to the premises, 
and was not the proximate cause of his injuries; the 
hazard was created by the plaintiff. 
In the exercise of reasonable care, was Thomas 
Child required to anticipate that Eddie Hoogland 
would enter his premises without invitation and 
thereafter be attracted to an ordinary-looking metal 
drum, the contents of which Mr. Child had no knowl-
edge, and hold ·a match to the opening, which would 
cause an explosion? To hold Child to such a stand-
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arcl of care would not only make him a guarantor 
against accidents but require clairvoyance. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment in favor 
of Thomas B. Child was properly granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
REX J. HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Thomas B. Child 
5t5 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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